Introduction 19
Whistleblowing can be a mode of ethical resistance (Glazer and Glazer, 1989 ); a 20 vehicle to promote rights through movements such as consumer issues (Greenwood, 2015) ; or 21 a process to give a voice to animal rights and environmental concerns with regard to an 22 organisation's practices. Whistleblowers are seen as either individuals who undertake heroic 23 and noble deeds; or as malcontent, trouble-makers and misfits for exposing wrongdoing 24 (Zakaria, 2015) . The term 'whistleblow' was coined by Nader et al., (1972) The aim of this research was to undertake a two-phase desktop review of literature 56 sources in order to conceptualise, frame, critique existing whistleblowing strategies and to 57 consider how whistleblowing strategies could be integrated within an effective food crime 58 management system (FCMS). The scope of the review included peer-reviewed articles, trade 59 publications and online news items. Regulatory sources were reviewed to provide examples 60 of legislative frameworks adopted to provide protection to whistleblowers. The second phase 61 of the review included analysis of literature sources to provide an evidence base for historic 62 examples of disclosure of criminal activity in the food chain and to critique the context in 63 which they had occurred. This analytical approach led to a preliminary conceptual 64 characterisation of whistleblowers and the factors that influence them. Lastly, the value of 65 whistleblowing strategies in the food sector was considered and critiqued. In this context food 66 crime has a wide focus and illegal activity can span food safety and food quality issues as 67 equally as illicit activity and behaviour. The aim of this paper is not to contextualise what 68 constitutes food crime specifically, but to look at the use of formal whistleblowing strategies 69 within a FCMS to mitigate and, where possible prevent, illegal activity. If the food industry 70 wants to effectively counter illicit and illegal practice, it must proactively ensure that internal 71 reporting channels are available for staff. If these protocols do not exist, there is increased risk 72 that external channels will be used to disclose wrongdoing and prevent an organisation from 73 rectifying the problem internally first . This highlights the importance 74 of whistleblowing as a management control mechanism to identify, mitigate and where 75 ) reported that health workers who reported misconduct were subjected to severe official 85 reprisals including demotion, reprimand and referral to a psychiatrist. There were also 86 instances of individuals experiencing threats, rejection by peers, pressure to resign and being 87 treated as a traitor, or experiencing a lack of progression in their career. Hwang et al., (2008, 88 2013) assert that personal relationships, fear of retaliation and also media coverage discourage 89 whistleblowing in Chinese society. Vinten (1996) associated the act of whistleblowing to a 90 "bee-sting phenomenon" suggesting the approach can only be used once, before the act itself 91 jeopardises the career of the whistleblower. Thus it is a high-stakes action and the potential 92 consequences post-reporting (both positive and negative) will influence an individual's 93 decision to either remain silent or to blow the whistle. 94
The PAWC (2013) report "Whistleblowing -The Inside Story" reviewed 1000 cases 95 between August 2009 and December 2010 across all industry sectors. Food and beverage 96 cases represented just 3% of the total cases so the results cannot be critiqued to reflect the 97 food supply chain specifically, however overarching themes associated with whistleblowing 98 can be determined. The whistleblowers' position was identified as executives (2%), 99 managerial (15%), professional (26%), skilled (27%) unskilled (13%) and administrative 100
Historic whistleblowing cases in the food industry suggest that whistleblowers 126 themselves suffer negative personal consequences including: depression and symptoms of 127 extremely poor mental health (Motarjemi, 2015a; 2015b by the organisation's management or co-workers against the whistleblower is perhaps the 135 most significant determinant of a whistleblower's intention to disclose wrongdoing. 136
Furthermore, if whistleblowers seek personal redress from organisations for the personal 137 consequences of their disclosure, in the event that the case comes to court, corporate bodies if 138 they so choose have significant financial resources to "buy witnesses, delay the legal 139 processes and exert political pressure" leaving the employee in question unable to progress 140 with new employment or to have closure (Motarjemi, 2015a) . 141
As part of this research a range of contemporary whistleblowing case studies across 142 the food industry have been drawn together. The cases reflect issues such as potential animal 143 welfare violations, bribery, corruption, and negligence with regard to food safety and food 144 quality issues (Table 1) . Disclosure was conducted both internally, and also externally to 145 parties such as regulators or the media. 146 Take in Table 1  147   148 The breadth of the scope of examples shown in Table 1 (Feige, 1990) . Further, the types of process verification activities undertaken in 167 market-focused second party audits and third party certification audits are constrained by the 168 scope of the system standards used, the planned nature, the time available and the frequency 169 of the audits, and the volume of data to be assessed (Manning, 2013; Manning and Soon, 170 2014) . Illicit behaviour in the food supply chain arises as a result of misrepresentation 171 associated with: 172
• product integrity: the intrinsic quality attribute of totality or completeness 173 (Manning and Soon, 2014);  174 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 and specific to an organisation, the products it produces and the associated supply chain. 204 of a FCMS seek to inspire staff to consider that food legality and compliance is important and 214 to empower them to realise fully their specific role in ensuring compliance. Further 215 employees need to be aware that there is always the potential for emerging or re-emerging 216 crime challenges that must be effectively controlled, or where possible eliminated. Thus 217 whistleblowing strategies need to be embedded into both the transactional FCMS to ensure 218 that individuals are aware of the organisation's systems and procedures and also in the 219 transformational culture. Senior management must demonstrate both through their 220 commitment to the FCMS in terms of both engagement and appropriate resource allocation 221 and also in their overseeing of an effective business culture that demonstrates that in a 222 transparent business such strategies are welcomed and adopted as part of a wider corporate 223 disclosure discourse. Lamming et al., (2001) Criminal organisations and networks complement and interact with traditional markets 229 and supply chains reducing transaction costs, and providing increased business opportunities 230 for both buyers and sellers (Williams, 2001 ). This entrepreneurial illicit approach (Manning et 231 al., 2016) is in contrast to the regulatory hierarchical mindset, bureaucratic rivalry and 232 competition, interagency antipathies, and hesitancy to share information, align databases or 233 coordinate enforcement operations (Williams, 2001 ). This makes crime mitigation activities 234 often less agile and reactive than the criminal networks they are seeking to disrupt. Whilst 235 FCMS are of value, integrated reactive measures such as whistleblowing protocols are 236 essential too. 237 238
Food crime management 205

Regulatory response towards protecting whistleblowers 239
European Union 240
The European Committee on Legal Co-operating (CDCJ) of the Council of Europe 241 developed the Recommendation CM/Rec (2014)7 on the protection of whistleblowers 242 (Council of Europe 2014). Member states are encouraged to develop a robust national 243 framework that facilitates and protects whistleblowers. The Recommendation sets out a 244 number of key principles to ensure that: laws to protect whistleblowers cover a broad range of 245 information that is in the public interest; individuals have access to more than one channel to 246 report and disclose such sensitive information; mechanisms are in place to ensure reports and 247 disclosures are acted upon promptly; whistleblowers are entitled to have their identities kept 248 confidential by those to whom they report; and all forms of retaliation are prohibited as long 249
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In the aftermath of the 2013 European horsemeat incident, the FSA's National Food 286
Crime Unit (NFCU) was created as a result of the recommendations in the Elliott Review 287 (2014) to help ensure that prevention measures are put in place to protect consumers from 288 food fraud (FSA n.d.). In addition to setting up the Unit, the Elliot Review strongly 289 recommended firstly that any incident of suspected and known food crime should be reported 290 directly by staff to their own employers and secondly that customers can report to 291 management any potential concerns (Elliot Review, 2014). Further there should be 292 encouragement of a culture within the food industry that questions sourcing in its supply 293 chain and also wider food integrity. However, the mechanisms that enable whistleblowing 294 and reporting with the food industry, including regulatory bodies, need developing further. 295
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United States 310
The United States (US) has one of the most comprehensive whistleblower provisions 311 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 clearly describes the act of whistleblowing, the rights and entitlements to protection not only 327 of the whistleblower themselves, but also the officials who are then required to perform a duty 328 to investigate. Indeed every employer with more than ten employees by law is required to 329 endorse an internal whistleblowing procedure. The procedure must be in a visible, accessible 330 location for all employees and it must also be posted on the company website if the company 331 has one. Fines can be imposed if businesses fail to undertake this requirement. There are also 332 strict timings set for competent authorities to adhere to in the event of external disclosure of 333 wrongdoing. 334 335
Market response towards protecting whistleblowers 336
The UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) issued a report in Chief Executive, Group Secretary, with routine responsibility falling to the human resources 343 department. In a small food business with both strategic and operational roles filled by one or 344 two individuals this could prove more difficult to disassociate. 345
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Whistleblowing models 405
A number of whistleblowing models exist in the literature that have been designed to address 406 mainly corporate fraud in the financial, business and public sectors but none specifically for 407 food industry. These have been analysed within this research (Table 3) Table 4 . 416 Tables 3 and 4  417 418 Henik (2015) draws upon existing theory to discuss a five-stage whistleblowing model 419 around which organisational whistleblowing strategies, such as those described in this paper 420 for ABF and HRG, can be developed. 421
Take in
Stage 1 -A trigger event 422
A trigger event is as an event that is deemed by an individual or group to be 423 problematic (Henik, 2015) . Factors that can trigger whistleblowing include internal 424 Table 3 . An individual trigger may be clear in terms of its 427 legality or the trigger may be opaque creating uncertainty as to whether to raise the issue with 428
others (PAWC, 2013). 429
Stage 2 -Determining of appropriate action 430
The whistleblower may be concerned whether complicity means that they themselves 431 may face sanction and this may limit action. PAWC (2013) identify in their study that in only 432 8% of the cases they examined the whistleblower admitted that they have been involved in the 433 factor that influences the route they follow to raise their concern. The group of workers they 444 identified as less likely to approach their line manager or senior management was unskilled 445
workers. In fact their study suggested that unskilled and skilled workers were more likely to 446 approach the individual(s) who they thought was the wrongdoer or disclose to an independent 447 body rather than other workers, or finally a regulatory body. This highlights if people are to 448 come forward with concerns that as well as transactional structure in the FCMS, 449 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Administrative workers were more likely to approach senior management or a union 451 representative through and use the employment grievance procedure rather than follow a 452 whistleblowing process or a specialist channel. This may be due to the type of trigger that 453 they were reporting, or greater awareness of policy and practice, but they were reticent about 454 approaching their line manager. Managers and executives were more likely to raise their 455 concern initially to senior management and also more likely to approach the media. 456
Ultimately, in order to prevent or reduce loss of profit, reputation and trust with customers, 457 the food industry should aim to resolve the problems internally whilst ensuring confidentiality 458 for the whistleblowers. 459
Stage 4 -Organisational reaction to action 460
PAWC (2013) state that from their dataset whistleblowers felt that no action was taken after 461 the first attempt of internal disclosure in 74% of cases and this rose to 80% when it was 462 unskilled workers who wore making the disclosure. At the third attempt in 44% of cases 463 whistleblowers felt there was no organisational reaction; this was zero cases at executive 464 level, but still 80% for unskilled workers. The work of Henik (2015) shows that the 465 organisation needs to make sure that they do not alienate the individuals who seek to disclose 466 potential wrongdoing especially as this can then provide personal motivation for justice and 467 restitution. Ensuring there is full confidence in the management process surrounding 468 whistleblowing is critical. 469
Stage 5 -Whistleblowers response 470
The whistleblowers who actively report on wrongdoing are the SMG or FUV (see 471   Table 4 for definitions). Inaction can be due to conflicting emotions and values. Therefore, a 472 FCMS encompassing both transformational and transactional approaches will be beneficial to 473 encourage the STM to act. Henik (2015) asserts that a differentiation of emotion will 474 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 • Commit to employees' professional growth and success so that they feel personally 500 invested in by the organisation and then as a result less likely to be compelled to 501 commit food crime; 502
• Communicate the organisational culture that is needed to minimise the potential for 503 food crime to all levels of staff and in the context that they will understand; 504
• Clarify organisational goals in terms of legality, product and personal integrity and 505 their role in helping to achieve them; 506
• Coach through providing appropriate and continuous training for employees so they 507 feel empowered to support the organisation and ensuring the products and services are 508 legally compliant and if necessary disclose with regard to wrongdoing; and 509
• Create accountability through a formal yet dynamic and reactive system that has 510 appropriate communication channels and assists employees to deliver their roles and 511 commitments at all levels of the organisation. 512
The 5 Cs demonstrate the transformational infrastructure that needs to be in place to underpin 513 the FCMS. A cultural shift towards an encouraging, and supportive environment for 514 whistleblowing can provide a source of intelligence that can help organisations to prevent 515 potential public health implications, loss of profit and protect the reputation of company. In 516 the development and implementation of a FCMS, small and medium sized food companies 517 may not have the resources and knowledge necessary to carry out risk assessments using tools 518 such as VACCP or TACCP, but with appropriate industry guidance they can more readily 519 implement a whistleblowing protocol within their organisation and with their suppliers. 520
With appropriate induction and refresher training, and ongoing coaching an 521 effective, and reactive FCMS can be developed which is appropriate to the situational needs 522 of every business. Indeed PAS 1998:2008 states that where the business is small and everyone 523 is known by name, transformational management processes may be strong enough so that a 524
complicated written protocol is not required, instead a simple statement will be of value to 525 that simply explains: the difference between whistleblowing and a private complaint with 526 management; how an employee can make an external disclosure and the benefits of an 527 independent helpline that facilitates the disclosure process; that whistleblowing is not a 528 mechanism for undermining managers; and the challenges with maintaining confidentiality. 529 530
Concluding remarks 531
Whistleblowing exposes illegal, inappropriate and fraudulent practices with the goal that 532 private and/or public exposure will force change. Many of these criminal practices go 533 undetected by regulatory authorities and at times senior management of an organisation. 534
Conventional behavioural models such as TRA and TPB can be extended to include 535 individual, organisational, cultural and situational factors to study whistleblowing intention 536 among food production workers and this has been the approach used in this conceptual paper 537 in developing Figure 2 . Greater understanding not only the forward process, but also the 538 feedback loops, and the situational factors of influence will assist food industry practitioners 539 in developing effective FCMS that include a whistleblowing strategy. Therefore appropriate 540 regulatory protection of those who engage in whistleblowing activities is crucial to both 541 mitigate food crime and protect consumers from loss and potential harm. Without considering 542 the specific difficulties that arise and addressing the existing barriers to whistleblowing it is 543 unlikely that the whistleblowing can become an effective strategy for addressing food crime. 544
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B r i t i s h F o o d
J o u r n a l Individual who focuses on accountability and results and who are motivated by strong extraorganisational allegiances and emotion (anger) at organisational inaction following their internal reporting. They seek appropriate mechanisms that will limit personal or professional impact.
Fed-up vigilante (FUV)
Individual who is initially motivated to advocate against wrongful activities by strong extraorganisational principles and is driven by revenge and catharsis, justice and restitution. As they may have already suffered retribution they can feel they have nothing left to lose or fear.
Servant of Two Masters (STM)
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